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Abstract. Attack trees are widely considered in the fields of security for the
analysis of risks (or threats) against electronics, computer control, or physical
systems. A major barrier is that attack trees can become largely complex and thus
hard to specify. This paper presents ATSyRA, a tooling environment to automati-
cally synthesize attack trees of a system under study. ATSyRA provides advanced
editors to specify high-level descriptions of a system, high-level actions to struc-
ture the tree, and ways to interactively refine the synthesis. We illustrate how
users can specify a military building, abstract and organize attacks, and eventu-
ally obtain a readable attack tree.
1 Introduction
Attack trees [8] provide a systematic way of describing the vulnerability of a system,
taking various types of attacks into account. Strengths of attack trees rely on two as-
pects: they combine an intuitive representation of possible attacks with formal mathe-
matical ways of analyzing them in a qualitative and quantitative way [6, 4]. Kordy et al.
showed that attack trees have been extensively studied by the scientific community and
are widely considered within the industry [5].
Up to now, analysts and technicians usually construct attack trees manually, based
on their knowledge and experience. A large number of tools for editing and analyz-
ing attack trees exist (see, e.g., [3, 4]). Unfortunately, the manual design of attack trees
is time-consuming and error-prone, especially if the size of the attack tree becomes
substantial. Moreover, a manual design is likely to be incomplete and unsound w.r.t.
the security issues of a system under consideration. Supported by automation, practi-
tioners can obtain large attack trees that are correct by construction and in line with
the properties of the system. Moreover the generation process can also be reiterated in
case new kinds of attacks emerge or the system evolves. As a consequence, automated
generation of attack trees recently attracts the attention of researchers and industry prac-
titioners [12, 9, 2, 11].
Specifically, our long-term objective is to develop a (semi-)automated process, ap-
plicable to a large panel of risk analysis domains (physical security, communication
security and dependability, business, management, engineering, etc.), that will assist
practitioners in fulfilling the security modeling task. This paper presents ATSyRA1 a
tool for synthesizing attack trees. ATSyRA is built upon the mathematical foundations
presented in [7]. Compared to [12, 9, 2, 11], ATSyRA aims to provide an interactive
and user-guided synthesis; an integrated environment with domain-specific languages
(DSLs) and advanced editors. We also aim to augment the level of abstraction and con-
sider as input high-level description of a system for generating attack trees.
Remainder. Section 2 presents the underlying methodology. Section 3 illustrates
the main features of ATSyRA. Section 4 identifies future work.
2 Towards Synthesis of Attack Trees
At the algorithmic level, we experienced that a naive fully automated generation is
likely to produce unexploitable trees (because they are flat), as also noticed by [2].
Mauw and Oostdijk [6] and Kordy et al. [4] showed that numerous structurally different
attacks trees can capture the same information, out of which a few are readable and
meaningful for an expert. An original and crucial feature of our methodology is the
support of high-level actions (HLA) [7] to specify how sequences of actions can be
abstracted and structured – a high-level action can be seen as a sub-goal of the attacker.
The typical workflow is depicted in Figure 1: inputs, either given by the practitioners
or generated by the tool, are depicted in round-corner boxes (1)-(4), and intermediate
tools/transformations are depicted in rectangle boxes (a)-(b). Dashed arrows suggest
partial automation and an involvement of users to generate the results.
3 ATSyRa: Tooling the Approach
We implement an environment, called ATSyRA, for realizing the methodology previ-
ously introduced. Our experience for assessing the physical security of military build-
ings2 motivated its design. The tool assists practitioners in synthesizing attack trees
from the high-level description of the system. In our case, we develop a domain-specific
language (DSL) for expressing military buildings. Other DSLs can be considered as
well. ATSyRA3 is implemented on top of Eclipse and offers to experts different facili-
ties (DSLs’ services like editors and automated reasoning support). Box (0) in Figure 1
is a screen-shot of the ATSyRA environment, with windows À-Ã, which we now detail.
À Experts define the system in a dedicated, textual or graphical language, called a
Building specification, which is composed of three main parts: the building descrip-
tion, the attacker’s strength level, and her attack objective.
– The building description is entirely determined by a finite set of elements of
four types: zones (rooms, garden, etc.), accesses (doors, windows, etc.), items
(keys) and alarms. Each type of elements is equipped with an attribute, called
its defense level, which determines the minimum strength attacker must possess
in order to act on this very element.
1 for “Attack-Tree Sythesis for Risk Analysis”.
2 in the context of a collaboration between IRISA and Defense Ministry in France (DGA).
3 http://tinyurl.com/ATSyRA.
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Fig. 1. The ATSyRA workflow
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– The attacker’s strength level is modelled by an integer value, that denotes her
knowledge and skills necessary to execute a given action on a given element
(such as opening a door, or using a key). This choice is by no mean a definitive
one, but it is acceptable for the first version of the tool.
– The attack objective consists of a final zone to reach, with some items collected,
and determines whether the scenario may be subject to detection by alarms.
Á Experts then run the generation of the set of attack scenarios. The underlying process
is the compilation of the Building specification into an attack graph. The transitions
of this attack graph are labelled by (atomic) actions inferred from the building’s
elements description, and which are executable by the attacker (according to her
strength level). The compilation process is highly compositional, allowing for the
generation of a symbolic (hence very succinct) attack graph. The target language
is GAL (for “Guarded Action Language”) [1], a simple yet expressive formalism
to model concurrent systems which is supported by a very efficient decision dia-
gram library for model-checking [10]. ATSyRA notably exploits a tuned reachabil-
ity analysis procedure. The objective is to produce the sequences of atomic actions
that yield paths in the graph and that correspond to winning attack scenarios.
Â Experts specify a set of high-level actions (HLAs) with a dedicated, textual lan-
guage. An HLA is described in terms of how it can be refined into less abstract
actions. The formalism is inspired from context-free grammars [7]: HLAs are the
non-terminal symbols of the grammar, atomic actions are terminal symbols, and
refinements are derivation rules.
Ã Experts eventually run the attack tree synthesis: this “final” step exploits both HLAs
specifications Â and generated attack scenarios Á. It relies on bottom-up syntactic
analysis techniques for the context-free derivation rules given by the HLAs and
input words given by the attack scenarios. Then, an algorithm (see details in [7])
merges the syntactic trees into the attack tree, the nodes of which have type ranging
over disjunction, conjunction and sequential conjunction.
ATSyRA is developed using model-driven principles technologies (e.g., Xtext, Sir-
ius). We can deliver almost for free advanced editors, being textual or graphical, with
auto-completion, syntax highlighting, location of errors, etc. Experts that specify mil-
itary buildings or HLA thus benefit from advanced and dedicated editing support. An-
other benefit is that our model-based tool is extensible. Other inputs for the high-level
description of a system can be seamlessly integrated and come with advanced editors
as well. For instance we are investigating the use of system description languages (e.g.,
SySML) as part of ATSyRA.
4 Conclusion
We presented ATSyRA, an environment built on top of Eclipse, to support a methodol-
ogy for synthesizing attack trees. Starting from a military building, we illustrated how
security experts can specify high-level actions and eventually generate readable and
well-structured attack trees.
As future work, we plan to consider other inputs – beyond military building speci-
fication – in other fields (e.g., computer networks). As the synthesis process is likely to
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be interactive and incremental, we plan to integrate as part of ATSyRA some visualisa-
tions and suggestions that can help an expert. We hope ATSyRA can be of interest for
practitioners and researchers in charge of analyzing security risks with attack trees.
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